## TRAJL BJTS

#### Linux security event monitoring with osquery

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- 1. Event-based tables on Linux
- 2. Audit 101
- 3. The next big thing
- 4. What's eBPF
- 5. Journey from zero to process\_events

#### Disclaimer: I like Spaceballs

State of the event-based tables





#### Awesome!

- Low memory usage
- Not many events to process
- Low CPU usage





Kind of annoying:

- Watchers have to be updated as events come in
- Relies on (globbing) existing files
- Prone to losing events
- No way to know if events were lost



Example

\$ cd /monitored
\$ mkdir -p 1/2/3/4/5 && \
 date > 1/2/3/4/5/hidden\_file

#### How to make file\_events lose changes





#### Audit tables

Interesting:

- Good insight on each event
- Can monitor most things

Not perfect:

- Uses a lot of memory
- Consumes a lot of CPU





Data sources alone determine the fate of the table's quality, **not the actual code**:

- How much memory is used?
- How much processing is required?
- Can events be trusted?

## Audit 101





A system tracing utility

- Syscalls
- System events

Used by most event-based tables:

- process\_events
- socket\_events
- user\_events
- selinux\_events
- process\_file\_events



## **NOTHING**! Teddy and I wrote it

# If you don't like it, you are **WRONG**



What is **actually** wrong with Audit?



- Only one Audit consumer\*
- Text-based
- Multiple records need to be a aggregated to create event context
- High memory footprint
- High CPU usage

The next big thing





What would we like?

- Event tracing
- Syscall tracing
- Context information for each event
- Binary data instead of text walls



### AMAZING

- Tracepoints!
- More tracepoints! Kprobes! Uprobes!
- Not much context information!
- Binary data! Finally!

### eBPF looks like a good candidate!

## What's eBPF







A technology to load arbitrary programs and have them run when a specific event occurs:

- Tracepoints: manually defined in the source, stable interface
- kprobes: basically code hooking

More data sources exist, but we are only interested in the first two





- eBPF programs are:
  - compiled into bytecode
  - $\circ$  Sandboxed
  - Verified kernel-side upon load

Can be built:

- Manually, with raw BPF opcodes
- Official toolchain



A toolkit for creating and compiling eBPF programs:

- developed by IOVisor,
- offers kernel instrumentation in C,
- has front-ends in Python and Lua,
- built on top of LLVM and Clang

## Journey from zero to process\_events





# Many fields, but let's start with the following ones:

- pid
- path
- cmdline



```
#include <uapi/linux/ptrace.h>
#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
```

```
typedef struct {
   u32 pid;
   char filename[NAME_MAX]; // 256 bytes
} ExecveData;
```

```
BPF_PERF_OUTPUT(events);
```

```
int sys_enter_execve(struct tracepoint__syscalls__sys_enter_execve *args)
{
```

```
ExecveData execve_data = {};
execve_data.pid = (u32) (bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32);
```

```
// We can't directly access user memory
```

```
events.perf_submit(args, &execve_data, sizeof(ExecveData));
return 0;
};
```



#include <uapi/linux/ptrace.h>
#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>

typedef struct {
 u32 pid;
 char filename[NAME\_MAX]; // 256 bytes
} ExecveData;

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int sys_enter_execve(struct tracepoint__syscalls__sys_enter_execve *args)
{
    ExecveData execve_data = {};
    execve_data.pid = (u32) (bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32);
```

```
// We can't directly access user memory
bpf_probe_read(&execve_data.filename,
```

```
sizeof(execve_data.filename),
args->filename);
```

```
events.perf_submit(args, &execve_data, sizeof(ExecveData));
return 0;
};
```



#include <uapi/linux/ptrace.h>
#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>

```
typedef struct {
   u32 pid;
   char filename[NAME_MAX]; // 256 bytes
} ExecveData;
```

```
BPF_PERF_OUTPUT(events);
```

```
int sys_enter_execve(struct tracepoint__syscalls__sys_enter_execve *args)
```

ExecveData execve\_data = {}; // Declare a new struct on stack execve\_data.pid = (u32) (bpf\_get\_current\_pid\_tgid() >> 32);

```
events.perf_submit(args, &execve_data, sizeof(ExecveData));
return 0;
};
```



#include <uapi/linux/ptrace.h>
#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>

```
typedef struct {
   u32 pid;
   char filename[NAME_MAX]; // 256 bytes
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#### BPF\_PERF\_OUTPUT(events);

```
int sys_enter_execve(struct tracepoint__syscalls__sys_enter_execve *args)
{
    ExecveData execve_data = {};
    execve_data.pid = (u32) (bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32);
    // We can't directly access user memory
    base carbon conditions and the Silverence
```

events.perf\_submit(args, &execve\_data, sizeof(ExecveData));
return 0;
};



#### The **filename** parameter is truncated at 256 bytes.

## You **COULD** increase the array size, but here's the thing: stack is limited to 512 bytes.

Can we do better?

```
int index = 0;
```

```
// Make sure to check for NULL values!
ExecveData *execve_data_ptr =
   temp_execve_data.lookup(&index);
```



#### We only have the binary name! What about program arguments?

Let's take a look at two possible workarounds:

- Use a bigger map
- Create additional maps



```
typedef struct {
   u32 pid;
   char filename[512];
```

```
char param1[512];
char param2[512];
char param3[512];
```

```
• • •
```

} ExecveData;

Too much space across perf\_events. Will make it easy to lose events.

### Second workaround/b: Using additional maps



Step one: data map

```
typedef struct {
   char bytes[2048];
} StringBuffer;
```

```
PER_CPU_ARRAY(
   string_data,
   StringBuffer,
   1000
);
```

#### Step two: index map

```
PER_CPU_ARRAY(
   string_data_index,
   int,
   1
);
```

Step three: event object

typedef struct {
 u32 pid;
 char filename[512];
 int parameters[20];
} ExecveData;





### We are still only getting N parameters! String size is still limited!





## NONE:(

#### Additional eBPF limitations

- Jumps can only go forward
- Only 4096 instructions per program





# Dedicated tracepoints Deeper inspection with kprobes

## Conclusions







- Audit is not that bad!
- eBPF is hard
- Using eBPF like we use Audit doesn't work
- . Teddy is a super hero